Preemptive scheduling on selfish machines

Authors:
Leah Epstein;Rob van Stee
Affiliations:
Department of Mathematics, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel;Department of Computer Science, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, Germany
Venue:
CAAN'07 Proceedings of the 4th conference on Combinatorial and algorithmic aspects of networking
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We consider the problem of scheduling on parallel uniformly related machines, where preemptions are allowed and the machines are controlled by selfish agents. Our goal is to minimize the makespan, whereas the goal of the agents is to maximize their profit. We show that a known algorithm is monotone and can therefore be used to create a truthful mechanism for this problem which achieves the optimal makespan. We extend this result for additional common goal functions.