An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents
Fast monotone 3-approximation algorithm for scheduling related machines
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Truthful approximation mechanisms for scheduling selfish related machines
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
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We consider the scheduling of groups of identical jobs on related machines with sequence independent setup times. We provide a 2-approximation algorithm for minimizing the makespan. The second result is a truthful, polynomial time, randomized mechanism for the batch scheduling problem with a deterministic approximation guarantee of 4.