Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On approximating optimal auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions: extended abstract
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Combinatorial Auctions
Single-value combinatorial auctions and implementation in undominated strategies
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A sufficient condition for truthfulness with single parameter agents
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Approximation algorithms for allocation problems: Improving the factor of 1 - 1/e
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
Operations Research
Approximating revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
A q-learning based adaptive bidding strategy in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
Revenue monotone mechanisms for online advertising
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on World wide web
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In combinatorial auctions that use VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders (see e.g. [5]). In our previous work [26], we showed that such failures of "revenue monotonicity" occur under an extremely broad range of deterministic strategyproof combinatorial auction mechanisms, even when bidders have "known single-minded" valuations. In this work we consider the question of whether revenue monotonic, strategyproof mechanisms for such bidders can be found in the broader class of randomized mechanisms. We demonstrate that---surprisingly- such mechanisms do exist, show how they can be constructed, and consider algorithmic techniques for implementing them in polynomial time. More formally, we characterize a class of randomized mechanisms defined for known single-minded bidders that are strategyproof and revenue monotonic, and furthermore satisfy some other desirable properties, namely participation, consumer sovereignty and maximality, representing the mechanism as a solution to a quadratically constrained linear program (QCLP). We prove that the QCLP is always feasible (i.e., for all bidder valuations) and give its solution analytically. Furthermore, we give an algorithm for running such a mechanism in time polynomial in the number of bidders and goods; this is interesting because constructing an instance of such mechanisms from our QCLP formulation in a naive way can require exponential time.