Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Stepwise randomized combinatorial auctions achieve revenue monotonicity
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Characterization of false-name-proof social choice mechanisms
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Revenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
Artificial Intelligence
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A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy-proof allocation rules. In particular, conditions called weak-monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of them. On the other hand, revenue monotonicity is recognized as one of the desirable properties. A combinatorial auction mechanism is revenue monotone if a seller's revenue is guaranteed to weakly increase as the number of bidders grows. Though the property is quite reasonable, there exists virtually no work on the characterization. In this paper, we identified a simple condition called summation-monotonicity. We then proved that we can construct a strategy-proof, revenue monotone mechanism if and only if the allocation rule satisfies weak-monotonicity and summation-monotonicity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to characterize revenue monotone allocation rules. In addition, we shed light on a connection between revenue monotonicity and false-name-proofness. In fact, we proved that, assuming a natural condition, revenue monotonicity is equivalent to false-name-proofness for single-item auctions.