Characterization of false-name-proof social choice mechanisms

Authors:
Taiki Todo
Affiliations:
Kyushu University, Nishi-ku, Fukuoka, Japan
Venue:
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Year:
2010

Citing 5
Cited 0

Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions

FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Online auctions with re-usable goods

Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions

Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions

AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-Proofness

WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Mechanism Design has been developed as a significant tool to model and analyze markets, economies, and societies in the real-world. On the Internet, however, we face some unexpected problems such as false-name manipulations, and traditional mechanism design does not work sufficiently. In this thesis, we will develop mechanism design into a more applicable theory for computer sciences and economics on the Internet. Specifically, we characterize social choice mechanisms that are robust against false-name manipulations.