Succinct representations of graphs
Information and Control
A note on succinct representations of graphs
Information and Control
Matching is as easy as matrix inversion
STOC '87 Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Some Methods for Nonlinear Multi-objective Optimization
EMO '01 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Evolutionary Multi-Criterion Optimization
On the approximability of trade-offs and optimal access of Web sources
FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multicriteria Optimization
Efficiently computing succinct trade-off curves
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Algorithmic Game Theory
Succinct approximate convex pareto curves
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Efficiency of (revenue-)optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Utilitarian mechanism design for multi-objective optimization
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
How good is the Chord algorithm?
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Small Approximate Pareto Sets for Biobjective Shortest Paths and Other Problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
On optimal single-item auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms: toward optimal combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multi-budgeted matchings and matroid intersection via dependent rounding
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Approximation of multiobjective optimization problems
Approximation of multiobjective optimization problems
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When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two criteria, that is, auctions that optimize, say, revenue under the constraint that the welfare is above a given level. If one allows for randomized mechanisms, it is easy to see that there are polynomial-time mechanisms that achieve any point in the trade-off (the Pareto curve) between revenue and welfare. We investigate whether one can achieve the same guarantees using deterministic mechanisms. We provide a negative answer to this question by showing that this is a (weakly) NP-hard problem. On the positive side, we provide polynomial-time deterministic mechanisms that approximate with arbitrary precision any point of the trade-off between these two fundamental objectives for the case of two bidders, even when the valuations are correlated arbitrarily. The major problem left open by our work is whether there is such an algorithm for three or more bidders with independent valuation distributions.