Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficiency of (revenue-)optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Revenue maximization with a single sample
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
FOCS '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing
FOCS '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Lower bounds on revenue of approximately optimal auctions
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the ratio of revenue to welfare in single-parameter mechanism design
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We study the extent to which simple auctions can simultaneously achieve good revenue and efficiency guarantees in single-item settings. Motivated by the optimality of the second price auction with monopoly reserves when the bidders' values are drawn i.i.d. from regular distributions [12], and its approximate optimality when they are drawn from independent regular distributions [11], we focus our attention to the second price auction with general (not necessarily monopoly) reserve prices, arguably one of the simplest and most intuitive auction formats. As our main result, we show that for a carefully chosen set of reserve prices this auction guarantees at least 20% of both the optimal welfare and the optimal revenue, when the bidders' values are distributed according to independent, not necessarily identical, regular distributions. We also prove a similar guarantee, when the values are drawn i.i.d. from a--possibly irregular--distribution.