WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Computing optimal bundles for sponsored search
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
On optimal single-item auctions
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Signaling schemes for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Signaling schemes for revenue maximization
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
To match or not to match: economics of cookie matching in online advertising
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Constrained signaling for welfare and revenue maximization
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Revenue maximization via hiding item attributes
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Signaling Competition and Social Welfare
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
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Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study of signaling when conducting a second price auction of a probabilistic good whose actual instantiation is known to the auctioneer but not to the bidders. This framework can be used to model impressions selling in display advertising. We establish several results within this framework. First, we study the problem of computing a signaling scheme that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue in a Bayesian setting. We show that this problem is polynomially solvable for some interesting special cases, but computationally hard in general. Second, we establish a tight bound on the minimum number of signals required to implement an optimal signaling scheme. Finally, we show that at least half of the maximum social welfare can be preserved within such a scheme.