Optimal mechanism design and money burning
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Crowdsourcing and knowledge sharing: strategic user behavior on taskcn
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Implementing optimal outcomes in social computing: a game-theoretic approach
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Crowdsourcing with endogenous entry
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Efficient crowdsourcing contests
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Auction-based crowdsourcing supporting skill management
Information Systems
Incentives, gamification, and game theory: an economic approach to badge design
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Auctions with unique equilibria
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Steering user behavior with badges
Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web
Agent failures in all-pay auctions
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective would be to maximize revenue, in crowdsourcing contests, the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality. We give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design: the optimal crowdsourcing contest is a virtual valuation optimizer (the virtual valuation function depends on the distribution of contestant skills and the number of contestants). We also compare crowdsourcing contests with more conventional means of procurement. In this comparison, crowdsourcing contests are relatively disadvantaged because the effort of losing contestants is wasted. Nonetheless, we show that crowdsourcing contests are 2-approximations to conventional methods for a large family of "regular" distributions, and 4-approximations, otherwise.