Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
Optimal marketing strategies over social networks
Proceedings of the 17th international conference on World Wide Web
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multi-parameter mechanism design under budget and matroid constraints
ESA'11 Proceedings of the 19th European conference on Algorithms
Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We study Bayesian mechanism design problems in settings where agents have budgets. Specifically, an agent's utility for an outcome is given by his value for the outcome minus any payment he makes to the mechanism, as long as the payment is below his budget, and is negative infinity otherwise. This discontinuity in the utility function presents a significant challenge in the design of good mechanisms, and classical "unconstrained" mechanisms fail to work in settings with budgets. The goal of this paper is to develop general reductions from budget-constrained Bayesian MD to unconstrained Bayesian MD with small loss in performance. We consider this question in the context of the two most well-studied objectives in mechanism design---social welfare and revenue---and present constant factor approximations in a number of settings. Some of our results extend to settings where budgets are private and agents need to be incentivized to reveal them truthfully.