Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders

Authors:
Sayan Bhattacharya;Elias Koutsoupias;Janardhan Kulkarni;Stefano Leonardi;Tim Roughgarden;Xiaoming Xu
Affiliations:
Max-Planck Institute für Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany;University of Oxford and University of Athens, Oxford, United Kingdom;Duke University, Durham, USA;Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy;Stanford University, Stanford, USA;Duke University, Durham, USA
Venue:
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Year:
2013

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Abstract

We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price benchmark, the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using supply-respecting prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the second-highest bid. As a consequence, our auctions are simultaneously near-optimal in a wide range of Bayesian multi-unit environments.