Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Combinatorial Auctions
Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
Operations Research
A Computational Analysis of Linear Price Iterative Combinatorial Auction Formats
Information Systems Research
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
On the incentive to deviate in core selecting combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 24th International Teletraffic Congress
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties. Furthermore, we discuss the benefits of this combinatorial auction, explore the use of alternative reserve pricing approaches in this context, and indicate the results of several hundred computational runs using CATS data.