Integer and combinatorial optimization
Integer and combinatorial optimization
Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
Iterative combinatorial auctions: achieving economic and computational efficiency
A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service
Management Science
Decentralized Mechanism Design for Supply Chain Organizations Using an Auction Market
Information Systems Research
GECCO '05 Proceedings of the 7th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation
Toward Comprehensive Real-Time Bidder Support in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
Information Systems Research
Combinatorial Auctions
A flexible model for tree-structured multi-commodity markets
Electronic Commerce Research
A Heuristic for Winner Determination in Rule-Based Combinatorial Auctions
INFORMS Journal on Computing
The Landscape of Electronic Market Design
Management Science
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations
Management Science
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
Management Science
Research Commentary---Designing Smart Markets
Information Systems Research
An Experimental Comparison of Linear and Nonlinear Price Combinatorial Auctions
Information Systems Research
Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
Operations Research
Fostering Networked Business Operations: A Framework for B2B Electronic Intermediary Development
International Journal of Intelligent Information Technologies
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Iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs) are IT-based economic mechanisms where bidders submit bundle bids in a sequence and an auctioneer computes allocations and ask prices in each auction round. The literature in this field provides equilibrium analysis for ICAs with nonlinear personalized prices under strong assumptions on bidders' strategies. Linear pricing has performed very well in the lab and in the field. In this paper, we compare three selected linear price ICA formats based on allocative efficiency and revenue distribution using different bidding strategies and bidder valuations. The goal of this research is to benchmark different ICA formats and design and analyze new auction rules for auctions with pseudodual linear prices. The multi-item and discrete nature of linear price iterative combinatorial auctions and the complex price calculation schemes defy much of the traditional game theoretical analysis in this field. Computational methods can be of great help in exploring potential auction designs and analyzing the virtues of various design options. In our simulations, we found that ICA designs with linear prices performed very well for different valuation models even in cases of high synergies among the valuations. There were, however, significant differences in efficiency and in the revenue distributions of the three ICA formats. Heuristic bidding strategies using only a few of the best bundles also led to high levels of efficiency. We have also identified a number of auction rules for ask price calculation and auction termination that have shown to perform very well in the simulations.