Insights and analyses of online auctions
Communications of the ACM
A theoretical and empirical investigation of multi-item on-line auctions
Information Technology and Management
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
A Combinatorial Auction with Multiple Winners for Universal Service
Management Science
Decentralized Mechanism Design for Supply Chain Organizations Using an Auction Market
Information Systems Research
Toward Comprehensive Real-Time Bidder Support in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
Information Systems Research
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
Management Science
Decision Analysis: The Right Tool for Auctions
Decision Analysis
A Computational Analysis of Linear Price Iterative Combinatorial Auction Formats
Information Systems Research
Research Commentary---Designing Smart Markets
Information Systems Research
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Combinatorial auctions are used for the efficient allocation of heterogeneous goods and services. They require appropriate software platforms that provide automated winner determination and decision support for bidders. Several promising ascending combinatorial auction formats have been developed throughout the past few years based on primal-dual algorithms and linear programming theory. The ascending proxy auction and iBundle result in Vickrey payoffs when the coalitional value function satisfies buyer submodularity conditions and bidders bid their best responses. These auction formats are based on nonlinear and personalized ask prices. In addition, there are a number of designs with linear prices that have performed well in experiments, the approximate linear prices auction, and the combinatorial clock auction. In this paper, we provide the results of lab experiments that tested these different auction formats in the same setting. We analyze aggregate metrics such as efficiency and auctioneer revenue for small-and medium-sized value models. In addition, we provide a detailed analysis not only of aggregate performance metrics but also of individual bidding behaviour under alternative combinatorial auction formats.