Evolutionary algorithms in theory and practice: evolution strategies, evolutionary programming, genetic algorithms
Co-evolutionary Auction Mechanism Design: A Preliminary Report
AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
Envy-free auctions for digital goods
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Multi-Issue Negotiation Processes by Evolutionary Simulation, Validationand Social Extensions
Computational Economics
Evolutionary optimization of ZIP60: a controlled explosion in hyperspace
Proceedings of the 8th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Efficient Methods for Multi-agent Multi-issue Negotiation: Allocating Resources
PRIMA '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Principles of Practice in Multi-Agent Systems
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Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated electronic commerce. We consider an approach where a seller negotiates over multiple interdependent attributes with many buyers individually. Bargaining is conducted in a bilateral fashion, using an alternating-offers protocol. In such a one-to-many setting, “fairness,” which corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions, may be an important business constraint. For the case of virtually unlimited supply (such as information goods), we present a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller, which take into account the fairness constraint, and consider multiple attributes simultaneously. We compare the performance of the bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of impatient buyers and small premature bargaining break off probability. Several of the developed strategies are able to extract almost all the surplus; they utilize the fact that the setting is one-to-many, even though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion.