Co-evolutionary Auction Mechanism Design: A Preliminary Report

  • Authors:
  • Steve Phelps;Peter McBurney;Simon Parsons;Elizabeth Sklar

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-;-;-

  • Venue:
  • AAMAS '02 Revised Papers from the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

Auctions can be thought of as a method for resource allocation. The economic theory behind such systems is mechanism design. Traditionally, economists have approached design problems by studying the analytic or experimental properties of different mechanisms. An alternative is to view a mechanism as the outcome of some evolutionary process involving buyers, sellers and an auctioneer, and so automatically generate not just strategies for trading, but also strategies for auctioneering. As a first step in this alternative direction, we have applied genetic programming to the development of an auction pricing rule for double auctions in a wholesale electricity marketplace.