Adaptive agents in a persistent shout double auction
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A grey-box approach to automated mechanism design
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ALAMAS'05/ALAMAS'06/ALAMAS'07 Proceedings of the 5th , 6th and 7th European conference on Adaptive and learning agents and multi-agent systems: adaptation and multi-agent learning
Auctions, evolution, and multi-agent learning
ALAMAS'05/ALAMAS'06/ALAMAS'07 Proceedings of the 5th , 6th and 7th European conference on Adaptive and learning agents and multi-agent systems: adaptation and multi-agent learning
A grey-box approach to automated mechanism design
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
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Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions, especially continuous double auctions, makes it difficult to apply the usual analytic game-theoretic methods to do this. This paper takes an experimental approach, searching a parameterized space of possible auction types, and presents a new pricing policy for continuous double auctions. The paper further demonstrates how this policy, together with a shout improvement rule, helps to reduce the fluctuation of transaction prices in auctions involving agents with minimum intelligence while keeping the overall efficiency high.