Experimental Market Mechanism Design for Double Auction

Authors:
Masabumi Furuhata;Laurent Perrussel;Jean-Marc Thévenin;Dongmo Zhang
Affiliations:
Intelligent Systems Laboratory, University of Western Sydney, Australia and IRIT, Université de Toulouse, France;IRIT, Université de Toulouse, France;IRIT, Université de Toulouse, France;Intelligent Systems Laboratory, University of Western Sydney, Australia
Venue:
AI '09 Proceedings of the 22nd Australasian Joint Conference on Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2009

Citing 6
Cited 1

Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation

Decision Support Systems - Special issue on economics of electronic commerce
Reducing price fluctuation in continuous double auctions through pricing policy and shout improvement

AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Online algorithms for market clearing

Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Characterizing effective auction mechanisms: insights from the 2007 TAC market design competition

Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
An Analysis of Entries in the First TAC Market Design Competition

WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
IAMwildCAT: The Winning Strategy for the TAC Market Design Competition

Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Is genetic programming "human-competitive"? the case of experimental double auction markets

IDEAL'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Intelligent data engineering and automated learning

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.01

Visualization

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce an experimental approach to the design, analysis and implementation of market mechanisms based on double auction. We define a formal market model that specifies the market policies in a double auction market. Based on this model, we introduce a set of criteria for the evaluation of market mechanisms. We design and implement a set of market policies and test them with different experimental settings. The results of experiments provide us a better understanding of the interrelationship among market policies and also show that an experimental approach can greatly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of market mechanism design.