What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms

  • Authors:
  • Jinzhong Niu;Kai Cai;Simon Parsons;Peter Mcburney;Enrico H. Gerding

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, USA 10016;Department of Computer Science, Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, USA 10016;Department of Computer and Information Science, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Brooklyn, USA 11210;Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK L69 7ZF;Department of Electronic and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK SO17 1BJ

  • Venue:
  • Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 tac Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.