JCAT: a platform for the TAC market design competition

Authors:
Jinzhong Niu;Kai Cai;Simon Parsons;Enrico Gerding;Peter McBurney;Thierry Moyaux;Steve Phelps;David Shield
Affiliations:
City University of New York;City University of New York;City University of New York;University of Southampton;University of Liverpool;University of Liverpool;University of Liverpool;University of Liverpool
Venue:
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: demo papers
Year:
2008

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Abstract

Auctions, when well designed, result in desirable economic out-comes and have been widely used in solving real-world resource allocation problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. The field of auction mechanism design has drawn much attention in recent years from economists, mathematicians, and computer scientists. In traditional auction theory, auctions are viewed as games of incomplete information and traditional analytic methods from game theory have been successfully applied to some simple types of auctions. However, the assumption of prior common knowledge in the incomplete information approach may not hold in some auctions, and computing analytic solutions may be infeasible in other auctions. Both of these problems hold in the case of continuous double auctions.