An evolutionary game-theoretic comparison of two double-auction market designs

  • Authors:
  • Steve Phelps;Simon Parsons;Peter McBurney

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK;Department of Computer and Information Science, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY;Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK

  • Venue:
  • AAMAS'04 Proceedings of the 6th AAMAS international conference on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems
  • Year:
  • 2004

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Abstract

In this paper we describe an analysis of two double auction markets—the clearing house auction and the continuous double auction. The complexity of these institutions is such that they defy analysis using traditional game-theoretic techniques, and so we use heuristic-strategy approximation to provide an approximated game-theoretic analysis. As well as finding heuristic-strategy equilibria for these mechanisms, we subject them to an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis which allows us to quantify which equilibria are more likely to occur. We then weight the design objectives for each mechanism according to the probability distribution over equilibria, which allows us to provide more realistic estimates for the efficiency of each mechanism.