Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
Management Science
Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Introduction to Linear Optimization
Introduction to Linear Optimization
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Solving concisely expressed combinatorial auction problems
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
SHARP: an architecture for secure resource peering
SOSP '03 Proceedings of the nineteenth ACM symposium on Operating systems principles
Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey
INFORMS Journal on Computing
Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions
Management Science
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Why markets could (but don't currently) solve resource allocation problems in systems
HOTOS'05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Hot Topics in Operating Systems - Volume 10
A statistical approach to risk mitigation in computational markets
Proceedings of the 16th international symposium on High performance distributed computing
Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on Data enginering issues in E-commerce and services: In conjunction with ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC '07)
On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Fast Partial Reallocation in Combinatorial Auctions for Iterative Resource Allocation
Agent Computing and Multi-Agent Systems
Evaluating the impact of inaccurate information in utility-based scheduling
Proceedings of the Conference on High Performance Computing Networking, Storage and Analysis
An approach to vickrey-based resource allocation in the presence of monopolistic sellers
AusGrid '09 Proceedings of the Seventh Australasian Symposium on Grid Computing and e-Research - Volume 99
An experimental analysis of biased parallel greedy approximation for combinatorial auctions
International Journal of Intelligent Information and Database Systems
Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Computational risk management for building highly reliable network services
HotDep'05 Proceedings of the First conference on Hot topics in system dependability
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
PRIMA'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Agent Based Simulation for a Sustainable Society and Multi-agent Smart Computing
CloudPack* exploiting workload flexibility through rational pricing
Proceedings of the 13th International Middleware Conference
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We present the first design for a fully expressive iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive for CEs. Bidders specify lower and upper bounds on their value for different trades. These bounds allow price discovery and useful preference elicitation in early rounds, and allow termination with an efficient trade despite partial information on bidder valuations. All computation in the exchange is carefully optimized to exploit the structure of the bid-trees and to avoid enumerating trades. A proxied interpretation of a revealed-preference activity rule ensures progress across rounds. A VCG-based payment scheme that has been shown to mitigate opportunities for bargaining and strategic behavior is used to determine final payments. The exchange is fully implemented and in a validation phase.