Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Market-based Proportional Resource Sharing for Clusters
Market-based Proportional Resource Sharing for Clusters
Solving Combinatorial Exchanges: Optimality via a Few Partial Bids
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
Fine Grained Resource Reservation in Open Grid Economies
E-SCIENCE '06 Proceedings of the Second IEEE International Conference on e-Science and Grid Computing
Second-Best Combinatorial Auctions - The Case of the Pricing-Per-Column Mechanism
HICSS '07 Proceedings of the 40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Combinatorial exchanges for coordinating grid services
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Strategy-Proof dynamic resource pricing of multiple resource types on federated clouds
ICA3PP'10 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Algorithms and Architectures for Parallel Processing - Volume Part I
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Market-based approaches proposed recently proved to be promising for competitive resource sharing in peer-to-peer and grid computing. Many approaches leverage on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to achieve incentive compatibility which embraces truthful bidding of participating agents. This paper addresses a deficiency of VCG that to the best of our knowledge has not been studied. When one or more agents possess a large portion of the market share of resource, a monopoly situation arises. Applying VCG mechanism does not lead to an allocation because the second price cannot be mathematically determined. Using both theoretical and simulation analysis, we show the importance of addressing this problem. Our results show that monopoly situation arises in many types of market settings, from auction to exchange, and with a relatively high occurrence rate. To address this, we propose a new pricing method suitable for many market settings that achieve budget balanced and economic efficiency but relax the strategy proof property.