Why markets could (but don't currently) solve resource allocation problems in systems
HOTOS'05 Proceedings of the 10th conference on Hot Topics in Operating Systems - Volume 10
Bridging the Adoption Gap-Developing a Roadmap for Trading in Grids
Electronic Markets
Achieving budget-balance with Vickrey-based payment schemes in exchanges
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
An approach to vickrey-based resource allocation in the presence of monopolistic sellers
AusGrid '09 Proceedings of the Seventh Australasian Symposium on Grid Computing and e-Research - Volume 99
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In this paper, two combinatorial exchange mechanisms MACE and GreedEx are introduced that are suitable for resource allocation in service-oriented environments such as Grids. MACE provides users with a fairly complex bidding language offering flexibility in the bidding process. This flexibility comes at the expense of computational tractability. GreedEx tremendously restricts the bidding language and thereby reduces the problem complexity considerably. As with any practical mechanism design effort, the designed artifact does not implement desirable allocations in dominant strategies. In this short paper we also introduced jCase as tool for evaluating the market outcome when agents are acting strategically on the market for Grids.