Back to original frugality

Authors:
Rodrigo A. Velez
Affiliations:
Texas A&M University
Venue:
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Year:
2013

Citing 7
Cited 0

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Algorithmic Game Theory

Algorithmic Game Theory

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Abstract

We review recent research on frugality of mechanisms for the procurement of a spanning network. Frugality here is defined as the ratio of the maximum price that can be charged to the buyer in some equilibrium to the true minimal cost. Previous negative results are qualified under natural restrictions in costs.