Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Commodity auctions and frugality ratios
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
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We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms "overpay" compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In particular we consider the fundamental case that the graph is composed of two node-disjoint s-t-paths of length s1 and s2 respectively, and prove an optimal √s1s2 lower bound (an improvement over √s1s2/2). This implies that the √-mechanism of Karlin et al. for path auctions is 2-competitive (an improvement over 2√2), and is optimal if the graph is a series-parallel network. Moreover, our results extend to universally truthful randomized mechanisms as well.