The budgeted maximum coverage problem
Information Processing Letters
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A lower bound for scheduling mechanisms
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions
FOCS '07 Proceedings of the 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
On the Hardness of Being Truthful
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Multi-unit Auctions with Budget Limits
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Non-monotone submodular maximization under matroid and knapsack constraints
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximate mechanism design without money
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Frugal and Truthful Auctions for Vertex Covers, Flows and Cuts
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Frugal Mechanism Design via Spectral Techniques
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A note on maximizing a submodular set function subject to a knapsack constraint
Operations Research Letters
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimizing budget allocation among channels and influencers
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
Budget feasible mechanism design: from prior-free to bayesian
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Optimization with demand oracles
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Learning on a budget: posted price mechanisms for online procurement
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Crowdsourcing to smartphones: incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing
Proceedings of the 18th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
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Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the problem of designing truthful budget feasible mechanisms for monotone submodular functions: We give a randomized mechanism with an approximation ratio of 7.91 (improving on the previous best-known result 233.83), and a deterministic mechanism with an approximation ratio of 8.34. We also study the knapsack problem, which is a special submodular function, give a 2 + √2 approximation deterministic mechanism (improving on the previous best-known result 5), and a 3 approximation randomized mechanism. We provide similar results for an extended knapsack problem with heterogeneous items, where items are divided into groups and one can pick at most one item from each group. Finally we show a lower bound of 1 + √2 for the approximation ratio of deterministic mechanisms and 2 for randomized mechanisms for knapsack, as well as the general monotone submodular functions. Our lower bounds are unconditional, and do not rely on any computational or complexity assumptions.