Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
SIAM Journal on Computing
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How much can taxes help selfish routing?
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on network algorithms 2005
Online multicast with egalitarian cost sharing
Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
An O( lognloglogn) upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley network design games
Information Processing Letters
Theoretical Computer Science
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Non-Cooperative Cost Sharing Games via Subsidies
Theory of Computing Systems - Special Section: Algorithmic Game Theory; Guest Editors: Burkhard Monien and Ulf-Peter Schroeder
Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On approximate nash equilibria in network design
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
The complexity of equilibria in cost sharing games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Non-Cooperative Multicast and Facility Location Games
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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The efficient design of networks has been an important engineering task that involves challenging combinatorial optimization problems. Typically, a network designer has to select among several alternatives which links to establish so that the resulting network satisfies a given set of connectivity requirements and the cost of establishing the network links is as low as possible. The Minimum Spanning Tree problem, which is well-understood, is a nice example. In this paper, we consider the natural scenario in which the connectivity requirements are posed by selfish users who have agreed to share the cost of the network to be established according to a well-defined rule. The design proposed by the network designer should now be consistent not only with the connectivity requirements but also with the selfishness of the users. Essentially, the users are players in a so-called network design game and the network designer has to propose a design that is an equilibrium for this game. As it is usually the case when selfishness comes into play, such equilibria may be suboptimal. In this paper, we consider the following question: can the network designer enforce particular designs as equilibria or guarantee that efficient designs are consistent with users' selfishness by appropriately subsidizing some of the network links? In an attempt to understand this question, we formulate corresponding optimization problems and present positive and negative results.