Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Network formation games with local coalitions
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On the value of coordination in network design
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Designing networks with good equilibria
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Online multicast with egalitarian cost sharing
Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Local Two-Stage Myopic Dynamics for Network Formation Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
An O( lognloglogn) upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley network design games
Information Processing Letters
Improved Bounds for Facility Location Games with Fair Cost Allocation
COCOA '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
When ignorance helps: Graphical multicast cost sharing games
Theoretical Computer Science
Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On approximate nash equilibria in network design
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Strategic multiway cut and multicut games
WAOA'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
Social context congestion games
SIROCCO'11 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Structural information and communication complexity
On the price of stability for undirected network design
WAOA'09 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Nash equilibria with minimum potential in undirected broadcast games
WALCOM'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Algorithms and computation
Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Strong price of anarchy for machine load balancing
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
The ring design game with fair cost allocation
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing games
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Price of stability in polynomial congestion games
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Social context congestion games
Theoretical Computer Science
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In this paper we address the open problem of bounding the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs posed in [1]. We consider the case where there is an agent in every vertex. We show that the price of stability is O(loglogn). We prove this by defining a particular improving dynamics in a related graph. This proof technique may have other applications and is of independent interest.