On the performance of user equilibria in traffic networks
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Network design with weighted players
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the value of coordination in network design
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Social context congestion games
SIROCCO'11 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Structural information and communication complexity
On the price of stability for undirected network design
WAOA'09 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Nash equilibria with minimum potential in undirected broadcast games
WALCOM'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Algorithms and computation
Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing games
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Price of stability in polynomial congestion games
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Social context congestion games
Theoretical Computer Science
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In this paper, we consider the Shapley network design game on undirected networks. In this game, we have an edge weighted undirected network G(V,E) and n selfish players where player i wants to choose a low cost path from source vertex s"i to destination vertex t"i. The cost of each edge is equally split among players who pass it. The price of stability is defined as the ratio of the cost of the best Nash equilibrium to that of the optimal solution. We present an O(logn/loglogn) upper bound on price of stability for the single sink case, i.e., t"i=t for all i.