Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Network design with weighted players
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the value of coordination in network design
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
An O( lognloglogn) upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley network design games
Information Processing Letters
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Social context congestion games
SIROCCO'11 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Structural information and communication complexity
The ring design game with fair cost allocation
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing games
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Price of stability in polynomial congestion games
ICALP'13 Proceedings of the 40th international conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Social context congestion games
Theoretical Computer Science
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We continue the study of the effects of selfish behavior in the network design problem. We provide new bounds for the price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation for undirected graphs. We consider the most general case, for which the best known upper bound is the Harmonic number Hn, where n is the number of agents, and the best previously known lower bound is 12/7≈1.778. We present a nontrivial lower bound of 42/23≈1.8261. Furthermore, we show that for two players, the price of stability is exactly 4/3, while for three players it is at least 74/48≈1.542 and at most 1.65. These are the first improvements on the bound of Hn for general networks. In particular, this demonstrates a separation between the price of stability on undirected graphs and that on directed graphs, where Hn is tight. Previously, such a gap was only known for the cases where all players have a shared source, and for weighted players.