The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
An O( lognloglogn) upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley network design games
Information Processing Letters
Network Design with Weighted Players
Theory of Computing Systems - Special Issue: Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures 2006; Guest Editors: Robert Kleinberg and Christian Scheideler
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the Value of Coordination in Network Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Weighted congestion games: price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the Performance of Approximate Equilibria in Congestion Games
Algorithmica - Special Issue: European Symposium on Algorithms, Design and Analysis
Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Tight Bounds for Selfish and Greedy Load Balancing
Algorithmica
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
On the price of stability for undirected network design
WAOA'09 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Communications of the ACM
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
The Price of Anarchy in congestion games has attracted a lot of research over the last decade. This resulted in a thorough understanding of this concept. In contrast the Price of Stability, which is an equally interesting concept, is much less understood. In this paper, we consider congestion games with polynomial cost functions with nonnegative coefficients and maximum degree d. We give matching bounds for the Price of Stability in such games, i.e., our technique provides the exact value for any degree d. For linear congestion games, tight bounds were previously known. Those bounds hold even for the more restricted case of dominant equilibria, which may not exist. We give a separation result showing that already for congestion games with quadratic cost functions this is not possible; that is, the Price of Anarchy for the subclass of games that admit a dominant strategy equilibrium is strictly smaller than the Price of Stability for the general class.