Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On nash equilibria for a network creation game
SODA '06 Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
The Price of Anarchy on Uniformly Related Machines Revisited
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
The Price of Stochastic Anarchy
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the Road to $\mathcal{PLS}$-Completeness: 8 Agents in a Singleton Congestion Game
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Parametric Packing of Selfish Items and the Subset Sum Algorithm
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Stability and Convergence in Selfish Scheduling with Altruistic Agents
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Approximate strong equilibrium in job scheduling games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Structured coalitions in resource selection games
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST)
Partition equilibrium always exists in resource selection games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the inefficiency of equilibria in linear bottleneck congestion games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the quality and complexity of pareto equilibria in the job scheduling game
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The price of anarchy on uniformly related machines revisited
Information and Computation
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
Approximate strong equilibria in job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines
Discrete Applied Mathematics
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As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for load balancing on related machines. We also give tight bounds for k-strong equilibria, where the size of a deviating coalition is at most k.