Journal of Computer and System Sciences - 26th IEEE Conference on Foundations of Computer Science, October 21-23, 1985
Simple local search problems that are hard to solve
SIAM Journal on Computing
Improving local search heuristics for some scheduling problems. Part II
Discrete Applied Mathematics - Special issue on models and algorithms for planning and scheduling problems
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Local Search in Combinatorial Optimization
Local Search in Combinatorial Optimization
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability; A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Performance Guarantees of Local Search for Multiprocessor Scheduling
Proceedings of the 8th International IPCO Conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
A survey of very large-scale neighborhood search techniques
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Approximate local search in combinatorial optimization
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the Impact of Combinatorial Structure on Congestion Games
FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Handbook of Approximation Algorithms and Metaheuristics (Chapman & Hall/Crc Computer & Information Science Series)
Theoretical Aspects of Local Search (Monographs in Theoretical Computer Science. An EATCS Series)
Theoretical Aspects of Local Search (Monographs in Theoretical Computer Science. An EATCS Series)
Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information
Theory of Computing Systems
Inapproximability of pure nash equilibria
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Structure in locally optimal solutions
SFCS '89 Proceedings of the 30th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Nashification and the coordination ratio for a selfish routing game
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
WAOA'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Atomic congestion games among coalitions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Local search for multiprocessor scheduling: how many moves does it take to a local optimum?
Operations Research Letters
Strong price of anarchy for machine load balancing
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
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In this paper, we investigate the complexity of computinglocally optimal solutions for Singleton Congestion Games (SCG) inthe framework of $\mathcal{PLS}$, as defined in Johnson et al.[25]. Here, in an instance weighted agents choose links from a setof identical links. The cost of an agent is the load (the sum ofthe weights of the agents) on the link it chooses. The agents areselfish and try to minimize their individual cost. Agents may formarbitrary, non-fixed coalitions. The cost of a coalition is definedto be the maximum cost of its members. The potential function isdefined as the lexicographical order of the agents’ cost. Ineach selfish step of a coalition, the potential function decreases.Thus, a local minimum is a Nash Equilibrium among coalitions ofsize at most k—an assignment where no coalition of size atmost k has an incentive to unilaterally decrease its cost byswitching to different links. The neighborhood of a feasibleassignment (every agent chooses a link) are all assignments, wherethe cost of some arbitrary non-fixed coalition of at most kreallocating agents decreases. We call this problem SCG-(k) andshow that SCG-(k) is $\mathcal{PLS}$-complete for k ≥ 8.On the other hand, for k = 1, it is well known thatthe solution computed by Graham’s LPT-algorithm [14,16,22] islocally optimal for SCG-(k). We show our result by tight reductionfrom the MaxConstraintAssignment-problem (p,q,r)-MCA, which is anextension of Generalized Satisfiability to higher valued variables.Here, p is the maximum number of variables occurring in aconstraint, q is the maximum number of appearances of a variable,and r is the valuedness of the variables. To the best of ourknowledge, SCG-(k) is the first problem, which is known to besolvable in polynomial time for a small neighborhood and$\mathcal{PLS}$-complete for a larger, but still constantneighborhood.