Inapproximability of pure nash equilibria

  • Authors:

  • Alexander Skopalik;Berthold Vöcking

  • Affiliations:

  • RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany;RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany

  • Venue:
  • STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

The complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in congestion games was recently shown to be PLS-complete. In this paper, we therefore study the complexity of computing approximate equilibria in congestion games. An alpha-approximate equilibrium, for α 1, is a state of the game in which none of the players can make an α-greedy step, i.e., an unilateral strategy change that decreases the player's cost by a factor of at least α. Our main result shows that finding an α-approximate equilibrium of a given congestion game is sc PLS-complete, for any polynomial-time computable α 1. Our analysis is based on a gap introducing PLS-reduction from FLIP, i.e., the problem of finding a local optimum of a function encoded by an arbitrary circuit. As this reduction is tight it additionally implies that computing an α-approximate equilibrium reachable from a given initial state by a sequence of α-greedy steps is PSPACE-complete. Our results are in sharp contrast to a recent result showing that every local search problem in PLS admits a fully polynomial time approximation scheme. In addition, we show that there exist congestion games with states such that any sequence of α-greedy steps leading from one of these states to an α-approximate Nash equilibrium has exponential length, even if the delay functions satisfy a bounded-jump condition. This result shows that a recent result about polynomial time convergence for α-greedy steps in congestion games satisfying the bounded-jump condition is restricted to symmetric games only.