On Best Response Dynamics in Weighted Congestion Games with Polynomial Delays

  • Authors:
  • Angelo Fanelli;Luca Moscardelli

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Computer Science, RWTH Aachen University, Germany and Division of Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;Department of Science, University of Chieti-Pescara, Italy

  • Venue:
  • WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We investigate the speed of convergence of best response dynamics to approximately optimal solutions in weighted congestion games with polynomial delay functions. In [1] it has been shown that the convergence time of such dynamics to Nash equilibrium may be exponential in the number of players n even for unweighted players and linear delay functions. Nevertheless, extending the work of [11], we show that 驴(n loglog W) (where W is the sum of all the players' weights) best responses are necessary and sufficient to achieve states that approximate the optimal solution by a constant factor, under the assumption that every O(n) steps each player performs a constant (and non-null) number of best responses.