Congestion games: equilibria, convergence and complexity

Authors:
Berthold Vöcking
Affiliations:
Department of Computer Science, RWTH Aachen University, Germany
Venue:
GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
Year:
2009

Citing 3
Cited 0

The complexity of pure Nash equilibria

STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the Impact of Combinatorial Structure on Congestion Games

FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Inapproximability of pure nash equilibria

STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing

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Abstract

Congestion games model the allocation of resources by selfish players. For example, players aim at allocating shortest paths in a network. The cost (delay) of a resource (edge) is assumed to be a function of the congestion, i.e., the number of players allocating the resource. We survey results about the existence and complexity of Nash equilibria in different variants of congestion games. Towards this end, we draw a connection to the complexity of local search and elaborate on the complexity class PLS (Polynomial Local Search).