Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Algorithmic Game Theory
(Almost) optimal coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Inapproximability of pure nash equilibria
STOC '08 Proceedings of the fortieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Network Design with Weighted Players
Theory of Computing Systems - Special Issue: Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures 2006; Guest Editors: Robert Kleinberg and Christian Scheideler
On the complexity of nash dynamics and sink equilibria
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
Nash equilibria in Voronoi games on graphs
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the complexity of pareto-optimal nash and strong equilibria
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Non-clairvoyant Scheduling Games
Theory of Computing Systems - Special Issue: Algorithmic Game Theory
| Hi-index | 5.23 |
We apply systematically a framework to settle the NP-hardness of some properties related to pure Nash equilibrium in Scheduling and Network Design Games. The technique is simple: first, we construct a gadget without a desired property and then embed it into a larger game which encodes a NP-hard problem in order to prove the complexity of the desired property in a game. This technique is very efficient in proving NP-hardness of the existence of a Nash equilibrium. In the paper, we illustrate the efficiency of the technique in proving the NP-hardness of the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in Matrix Scheduling Games and Weighted Network Design Games. Moreover, using the technique, we can settle not only the complexity of the equilibrium existence but also that of the existence of good cost-sharing protocol.