On approximate nash equilibria in network design
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Strategic cooperation in cost sharing games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Optimal cost sharing protocols for scheduling games
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Restoring pure equilibria to weighted congestion games
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
Nash equilibria with minimum potential in undirected broadcast games
WALCOM'12 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Algorithms and computation
Minimizing rosenthal potential in multicast games
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Social context in potential games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
NP-hardness of pure Nash equilibrium in Scheduling and Network Design Games
Theoretical Computer Science
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Designing and deploying a network protocol determines the rules by which end users interact with each other and with the network. We consider the problem of designing a protocol to optimize the equilibrium behavior of a network with selfish users. We consider network cost-sharing games, where the set of Nash equilibria depends fundamentally on the choice of an edge cost-sharing protocol. Previous research focused on the Shapley protocol, in which the cost of each edge is shared equally among its users. We systematically study the design of optimal cost-sharing protocols for undirected and directed graphs, single-sink and multicommodity networks, and different measures of the inefficiency of equilibria. Our primary technical tool is a precise characterization of the cost-sharing protocols that induce only network games with pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We use this characterization to prove, among other results, that the Shapley protocol is optimal in directed graphs and that simple priority protocols are essentially optimal in undirected graphs.