International Journal of Game Theory
Making greed work in networks: a game-theoretic analysis of switch service disciplines
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Network Design with Weighted Players
Theory of Computing Systems - Special Issue: Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures 2006; Guest Editors: Robert Kleinberg and Christian Scheideler
Worst-Case Efficiency Analysis of Queueing Disciplines
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th Internatilonal Collogquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part II
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
Total latency in singleton congestion games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
On the existence of pure nash equilibria inweighted congestion games
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Weighted congestion games: price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the existence of and convergence of natural dynamics to a pure Nash equilibrium. Weighted variants of congestion games that rely on sharing costs proportional to players' weights do not generally have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We propose a new way of assigning costs to players with weights in congestion games that recovers the important properties of the unweighted model. This method is derived from the Shapley value, and it always induces a game with a (weighted) potential function. For the special cases of weighted network cost-sharing and atomic selfish routing games (with Shapley value-based cost shares), we prove tight bounds on the price of stability and price of anarchy, respectively.