Making greed work in networks: a game-theoretic analysis of switch service disciplines
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - STOC 2002
Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game
Mathematics of Operations Research
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
Convergence to and quality of equilibria in distributed systems
Convergence to and quality of equilibria in distributed systems
Restoring pure equilibria to weighted congestion games
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
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Consider n users vying for shares of a divisible good. Every user i wants as much of the good as possible but has diminishing returns, meaning that its utility U i (x i ) for x i *** 0 units of the good is a nonnegative, nondecreasing, continuously differentiable concave function of x i . The good can be produced in any amount, but producing $X = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ units of it incurs a cost C (X ) for a given nondecreasing and convex function C that satisfies C (0) = 0. Cost might represent monetary cost, but other interesting interpretations are also possible. For example, x i could represent the amount of traffic (measured in packets, say) that user i injects into a queue in a given time window, and C (X ) could denote aggregate delay (X ·c (X ), where c (X ) is the average per-unit delay). An altruistic designer who knows the utility functions of the users and who can dictate the allocation x = (x 1 ,...,x n ) can easily choose the allocation that maximizes the welfare $W(x) = \sum_{i=1}^n U_i(x_i) - C(X)$, where $X = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$, since this is a simple convex optimization problem.