Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
A scheduling model for reduced CPU energy
FOCS '95 Proceedings of the 36th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
The Mathematics of Internet Congestion Control (Systems and Control: Foundations and Applications)
Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Fairness and optimality in congestion games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithms for pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
Journal of Experimental Algorithmics (JEA)
Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Pure Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games
Theoretical Computer Science
Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
Theoretical Computer Science
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Network Design with Weighted Players
Theory of Computing Systems - Special Issue: Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures 2006; Guest Editors: Robert Kleinberg and Christian Scheideler
Efficiency of Scalar-Parameterized Mechanisms
Operations Research
Fast and compact: a simple class of congestion games
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
SIAM Journal on Computing
On the Value of Coordination in Network Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Sharing the Cost of a Capacity Network
Mathematics of Operations Research
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Designing Fast Converging Cost Sharing Methods for Multicast Transmissions
Theory of Computing Systems
Weighted congestion games: price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
Minimum-Cost Network Design with (Dis)economies of Scale
FOCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Buy-at-Bulk Network Design with Protection
Mathematics of Operations Research
Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
Theory of Computing Systems
Optimal cost sharing protocols for scheduling games
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms
Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Competitive Cost Sharing with Economies of Scale
Algorithmica
Restoring pure equilibria to weighted congestion games
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
SIAM Journal on Computing
Strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The equilibrium existence problem in finite network congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Routing (un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific linear latency functions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Atomic congestion games among coalitions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
A scalable network resource allocation mechanism with bounded efficiency loss
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
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Joint use of resources with usage-dependent cost raises the question: who pays how much? We study cost sharing in resource selection games where the strategy spaces are either singletons or bases of a matroid defined on the ground set of resources. Our goal is to design cost sharing protocols so as to minimize the resulting price of anarchy and price of stability. We investigate three classes of protocols: basic protocols guarantee the existence of at least one pure Nash equilibrium; separable protocols additionally require that the resulting cost shares only depend on the set of players on a resource; uniform protocols are separable and require that the cost shares on a resource may not depend on the instance, that is, they remain the same even if new resources are added to or removed from the instance. We find optimal basic and separable protocols that guarantee the price of stability and price of anarchy to grow logarithmically in the number of players, except for the case of matroid games induced by separable protocols where the price of anarchy grows linearly with the number of players. For uniform protocols we show that the price of anarchy is unbounded even for singleton games.