Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property

  • Authors:
  • Tobias Harks;Max Klimm;Rolf H. Möhring

  • Affiliations:
  • Institut für Mathematik, Technische Universität Berlin,;Institut für Mathematik, Technische Universität Berlin,;Institut für Mathematik, Technische Universität Berlin,

  • Venue:
  • WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We provide an axiomatic framework for the the well studied lexicographical improvement property and derive new results on the existence of strong Nash equilibria for a very general class of congestion games with bottleneck objectives. This includes extensions of classical load-based models, routing games with splittable demands, scheduling games with malleable jobs, and more.