The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
FOCS '05 Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Algorithms for pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
Journal of Experimental Algorithmics (JEA)
Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Congestion games with variable demands
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
The equilibrium existence problem in finite network congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Fundamental design issues for the future Internet
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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In this paper, we introduce a class of games which we term demand allocation games that combines the characteristics of finite games such as congestion games and continuous games such as Cournot oligopolies. In a strategy profile each player may choose both an action out of a finite set and a non-negative demand out of a convex and compact interval. The utility of each player is assumed to depend solely on the action, the chosen demand, and the aggregated demand on the action chosen. We show that this general class of games possess a pure Nash equilibrium whenever the players' utility functions satisfy the assumptions negative externality, decreasing marginal returns and homogeneity. If one of the assumptions is violated, then a pure Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. We demonstrate the applicability of our results by giving several concrete examples of games that fit into our model.