The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Game
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Convergence and approximation in potential games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
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An instance of the max k−cut game is an edge weighted graph Every vertex is controlled by an autonomous agent with strategy space [1..k] Given a player i, his payoff is defined as the total weight of the edges [i,j] such that player j's strategy is different from player i's strategy The social welfare is defined as the weight of the cut, i.e half the sum of the players payoff It is known that this game always has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, a state from which no single player can deviate Instead we focus on strong equilibria, a robust refinement of the pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions of any size We study the strong equilibria of the max k−cut game under two perspectives: existence and worst case social welfare compared to a social optimum.