On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Game

  • Authors:
  • Laurent Gourvès;Jérôme Monnot

  • Affiliations:
  • LAMSADE, CNRS FRE 3234 & Universitéé de Paris-Dauphine,;LAMSADE, CNRS FRE 3234 & Universitéé de Paris-Dauphine,

  • Venue:
  • WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

This paper deals with two games defined upon well known generalizations of max cut. We study the existence of a strong equilibrium which is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. Bounds on the price of anarchy for Nash equilibria and strong equilibria are also given. In particular, we show that the max cut game always admits a strong equilibrium and the strong price of anarchy is 2/3.