Atomic routing games on maximum congestion
Theoretical Computer Science
Strong Nash Equilibria in Games with the Lexicographical Improvement Property
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Routing games for traffic engineering
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Bottleneck congestion games with logarithmic price of anarchy
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the inefficiency of equilibria in linear bottleneck congestion games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
A Stackelberg strategy for routing flow over time
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Taming traffic dynamics: Analysis and improvements
Computer Communications
Minimum delay load-balancing via nonparametric regression and no-regret algorithms
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
Stronger Bounds on Braess's Paradox and the Maximum Latency of Selfish Routing
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics
On a noncooperative model for wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games
Theoretical Computer Science
A game-theoretic approach to stable routing in max-min fair networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, each associated with a positive flow demand, and a load-dependent performance function for each network element; the social (i.e., system) objective is to optimize the performance of the worst element in the network (i.e., the network bottleneck). Although we show that such "bottleneck" routing games appear in a variety of practical scenarios, they have not been considered yet. Accordingly, we study their properties, considering two routing scenarios, namely when a user can split its traffic over more than one path (splittable bottleneck game) and when it cannot (unsplittable bottleneck game). First, we prove that, for both splittable and unsplittable bottleneck games, there is a (not necessarily unique) Nash equilibrium. Then, we consider the rate of convergence to a Nash equilibrium in each game. Finally, we investigate the efficiency of the Nash equilibria in both games with respect to the social optimum; specifically, while for both games we show that the price of anarchy is unbounded, we identify for each game conditions under which Nash equilibria are socially optimal.