On the inefficiency of equilibria in linear bottleneck congestion games

  • Authors:
  • Bart de Keijzer;Guido Schäfer;Orestis A. Telelis

  • Affiliations:
  • Center for Mathematics and Computer Science, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;Center for Mathematics and Computer Science, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands;Center for Mathematics and Computer Science, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

  • Venue:
  • SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

We study the inefficiency of equilibrium outcomes in bottleneck congestion games. These games model situations in which strategic players compete for a limited number of facilities. Each player allocates his weight to a (feasible) subset of the facilities with the goal to minimize the maximum (weight-dependent) latency that he experiences on any of these facilities. We derive upper and (asymptotically) matching lower bounds on the (strong) price of anarchy of linear bottleneck congestion games for a natural load balancing social cost objective (i.e., minimize the maximum latency of a facility). We restrict our studies to linear latency functions. Linear bottleneck congestion games still constitute a rich class of games and generalize, for example, load balancing games with identical or uniformly related machines with or without restricted assignments.