Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Fast convergence of selfish rerouting
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Selfish routing with atomic players
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The effect of collusion in congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Theoretical Computer Science - Automata, languages and programming: Algorithms and complexity (ICALP-A 2004)
Convergence time to Nash equilibria
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
Nashification and the coordination ratio for a selfish routing game
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Symmetry in network congestion games: pure equilibria and anarchy cost
WAOA'05 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Atomic selfish routing in networks: a survey
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On the inefficiency of equilibria in congestion games
IPCO'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Network games with atomic players
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Routing selfish unsplittable traffic
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Selfishness, collusion and power of local search for the ADMs minimization problem
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Atomic Congestion Games: Fast, Myopic and Concurrent
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the Road to $\mathcal{PLS}$-Completeness: 8 Agents in a Singleton Congestion Game
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow
Approximation and Online Algorithms
The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game
Theoretical Computer Science
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Selfishness, collusion and power of local search for the ADMs minimization problem
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Structured coalitions in resource selection games
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST)
On the existence of pure nash equilibria inweighted congestion games
ICALP'10 Proceedings of the 37th international colloquium conference on Automata, languages and programming
Weighted congestion games: price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Partition equilibrium always exists in resource selection games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Social context congestion games
SIROCCO'11 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Structural information and communication complexity
On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
Probabilistic techniques in algorithmic game theory
SAGA'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Stochastic Algorithms: foundations and applications
Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
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We consider algorithmic questions concerning the existence, tractability and quality of atomic congestion games, among users that are considered to participate in (static) selfish coalitions. We carefully define a coalitional congestion model among atomic players. Our findings in this model are quite interesting, in the sense that we demonstrate many similarities with the non–cooperative case. For example, there exist potentials proving the existence of Pure Nash Equilibria (PNE) in the (even unrelated) parallel links setting; the Finite Improvement Property collapses as soon as we depart from linear delays, but there is an exact potential (and thus PNE) for the case of linear delays, in the network setting; the Price of Anarchy on identical parallel links demonstrates a quite surprising threshold behavior: it persists on being asymptotically equal to that in the case of the non–cooperative KP–model, unless we enforce a sublogarithmic number of coalitions. We also show crucial differences, mainly concerning the hardness of algorithmic problems that are solved efficiently in the non–cooperative case. Although we demonstrate convergence to robust PNE, we also prove the hardness of computing them. On the other hand, we can easily construct a generalized fully mixed Nash Equilibrium. Finally, we propose a new improvement policy that converges to PNE that are robust against (even dynamically forming) coalitions of small size, in pseudo–polynomial time.