Atomic selfish routing in networks: a survey

Authors:
Spyros Kontogiannis;Paul Spirakis
Affiliations:
Computer Science Department, University of Ioannina, Ioannina, Greece;Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, Rio-Patra, Greece
Venue:
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2005

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Abstract

In this survey we present some recent advances in the literature of atomic (mainly network) congestion games. The algorithmic questions that we are interested in have to do with the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the efficiency of their construction when they exist, as well as the gap of the best/worst (mixed in general) Nash equilibria from the social optima in such games, typically called the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability respectively.